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1. The Project 
A market-geared company thrives through the transformation of its resources. 
These resources can be either primary or secondary. Primary resources are 
essential for the acquisition and utilization of other kinds of resources. In 
many companies, the main primary resources are the momentary ones. Inflow 
of capital into the organization is a prerequisite for the acquisition of other 
resources needed for its activities, such as employees, raw materiais, and 
technological production facilities. Together, these components constitute the 
basis of the company's material resource transformations (Fig. 1). 
A company possessing these funds and supplies is not yet productive, unless 
a transformation of intellectual resources is maintained alongside the transfor-
mation of material resources. The primary resources for this transformation 
are varying kinds of knowledge and information. The output achieved is a 
processed intellectual product which is necessary for the material activities 
to function and develop positively (Fig. 2). At present, companies are investing 
heavily in optimizing the transformation of material resources. Training, 
computerization, administration, target-orientation, strategie planning, and 
rationalization are the means by which basic resources achieve optimally 
efficient production. But whatever happened to the intellectual transformation 
process? Some companies have started regarding it as essential and worth 
investing in, while others have developed it only very little or not at all. In 
the former case, information is used as a resource; in the latter, rather as a 
product.' 
In early 1986, the Department of Library and Information Science of Äbo 
Akademi - The Swedis'h University of Finland - launched a project 
investigating these questions. A specific aim of the project is the analysis of the 
factors determining information culture in a business environment. The target 
groups chosen were on the one hand the small and medium-sized metalwork-
ing companies and, on the other hand, the giants of the field. Thirty-nine 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) were interviewed. The technique applied was 
a semi-structured thematic interview lasting for several hours per interviewee. 
Every interview was tape-recorded and transcribed. Responses were graded 
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Fig. I Material resource transformations. 
with a view to obtaining total scores for the various theme headings. The 
results were evaluated mainly according to soft methods, and they were further 
supported by the results of combined factor and regression analysis. 
2. Results 
The aspects investigated can be grouped under three main headings: 
(a) The CEO's approach 10 information was described in terms of six 
variables, namely: 
1. Use of internal information 
2. Use of external information 
3. Use of oral information 
4. Use of written information 
5. Quantity of information used 
6. Attitudes towards information. 
(b) Company characleristics included the following variables: 
I. Size and age 
2. Efficiency 
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Fig. 2 Intellectual resource transformations. 
3. Level of research, know-how, and knowledge 
4. Internal communication level 
5. External communication level 
6. Problem level (development phase, life cycle, and culture). 
(c) Personal characteristics of the CEOs included the following variables: 
1. Age, training, and work experience 
2. Experiential orientation 
3. Market orientation 
4. Production orientation 
5. Approach to administration and management. 
All the variables within these three main sections comprise a large number of 
different questions, grouped and graded so that higher scores refIect a higher 
degree of orientation. The analysis of the approach to information in relation 
to sections (b) and (c) revealed interesting links, which were further cor-
roborated by subsequent factor and regression analysis. These links were also 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
(Independent variables) 
Lack of expertise (0.89) 
Large top management team (0.67) 
High frequency of management meetings (0.75) 
Good internal information system (0.53) 
Company information to employees (0.54) 
Internal meetings, talks (0.51) 
Company newsletter (0.57) 
Insufficient internal knowledge of market 
in management 's opinion (0.79) 
Information materiaVturnover (-0.64) 
Advertising budget/turnover (0.68) 
Cu stomer important (0.59) 
Market information most important of all (-0.31) 
Company image (0.67) 
Market the most important success factor (-0.81) 
Financing is a success factor (0.93) 
Information important (0.79) 
Company information to employees (0.56) 
Internal meetings (0.81) 
Circulating documents (0.64) 
Company newsletter (0.51) 
Number of levels in organizational model (-0.74) 
Management level of training high (0.82) 
Continuous training of 
middle management (0.70) 
Knowledge important success factor (0.78) 
Actuality important success factor (0.66) 
Image important success factor (0.77) 
Motivation important success factor (0.64) 
Continuity important success factor (0.71) 
Capability of development 
important success factor (-0.63) 
Market important success factor (0.68) 
Personnel important success factor (-0.83) 
Fig. 3 
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'Development' 
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CEO information profile 





Extensive reading of: 
Daily newspapers (0.40) 
Journals (0.55) 
Scientific journals (0.60) 
Applies and discusses 
information from 
articles in his work (0.61) 
Industrial organizations 
Important sources 
of information (-0.44) 
Good knowledge and 
identification of 
individual articles (0.73) 
Extensive reading of 
professionally oriented 
journals (0.64) 
Able to identify and 
discuss individual 
writers (0.71) 
For internal information 
relies mainly on oral 
sources (-0.88) 
For external information 
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used to establish different characteristic company blocks. Inter-relations bet-
ween eEO information culture, company life cycle, company culture, and 
product market success are discussed in this paper. 
An SAS program me with varimax factor rotation and stepwise regression 
procedure was used for the factor and regression analyses. The results included, 
among other things, the correlations shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. 
2.1 Correlations between CEO information culture, company life cycle, 
company culture, and product market success 
During their lifespan, companies go through two interesting development 
phenomena. One concerns different phases of their chronological develop-
ment, 2,5,6, 8 and the other is an evolutionary cycle, also referred to as the com-
pany life cycle. 4, 7 
The individual phases of chronological development are initiated by the 
company's problems and crises. Each phase is characterized by its own specific 
problems, which uItimately bring about a crisis. It can be said that a company 
develops from one crisis to another and th at its need for knowledge and infor-
mation is rooted in this very characteristic. The number of crises (and phases), 
as defined by different researchers, varies, but a summary might comprise five 
different phases, which are: (1) the initial phase, (2) the functional phase, (3) 
the decentralization phase, (4) the official supervision phase, and (5) the infor-
mation phase. To put it briefly, in the first phase, activities are set up (Fig. 5). 
In the second phase, various functions diversify and a formal structure and 
hierarchy are established. During the third phase, tasks are delegated to the 
appropriate levels. In the fourth phase, the eEO starts losing control of 
activities, and a need for official supervision arises. In the fifth phase, the 
company enters a stage where it strives to achieve complete integration of 
activities and diversified information. For the first time, information becomes 
a need recognized by the eEO in phase 4. I 
In each development phase, companies may be at different stages of their 
life cycles. The life cycle is the phenomenon which, in conjunction with the 
development phase, determines company ideologies, norms, attitudes to prob-
lems, and the nature of the problems themselves. Initially, the life cycle phases 
coincide with the stages of chronological development, but may later develop 
independently within the various development phases, or as partial functions 
of company activities, e.g. within different strategic business units (SBUs). 
The company life cycle is, generally divided into five phases: 4,7 
• Birth Phase I 
The company is young, lacks experience, is extrovert, audacious and 
informal. 
• Growth Phase /I 
Attention focuses on output and growth, the company adopts a more 




Poor task allocation (0.58) 
Co-ordination problems (0.62) 
Excessive complexity (0.68) 
Co-operation problems (0.61) 
Knowledge important (-0.78) 
Actuality important (-0.66) 
Image important (-0.77) 
Administration important (0.71) 
Competence important (0.83) 
Ideological training (0.57) 
Business idea important (-0.5) 
Material values important (0.61) 
Top management level of 
knowledge high (-0.83) 
Training of middle management (-0.705) 
Information important 
to entrepreneurs (-0.79) 
Company information to employees (-0.56) 
Intemal meetings (0.81) 
Poor production (0.78) 
Poor administration (0.82) 
Demand-imposing groups 
clearly recognized (-0.60) 
The company should be 
active outwardly (-0.75) 
CEO has knowledge of current jJroduction 
research and uses it in his work (-0.5) 
Awareness of research ers in company 
line of business (-0.92) 
CEO has knowledge of current production 
research and uses it in his work (0.5) 
Awareness of researchers in company 
line of business (0.92 
. REGRESSION ANAL~SIS 
'Stagnation' 
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FAcrOR ANALYSIS 
(Dependent variables) 
Restricted CEO information profile. 
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Fig. 5 The chronological development of a company. 
decision-making process becomes more complex, CEOs pay more attention 
to employee demands and thereby become more aware of internal company 
matters. 
• Maturity Phase III 
Companies are older and bigger, the market is heterogeneous, bureaucracy 
increases, internal achievements assume more and more significance, com-
pany history and culture are important. 
• Revival Phase IV 
Old traditions are abolished, employees dismissed, the company looks for 
new knowledge and expertise, fresh ideas and innovation. Attention focuses 
maximallyon external matters. 
• Decline Phase V 
This phase may start at any point and is characterized by falling pro fit-
ability, emphasis on cost-cutting, rigorous control of internal activities, low 
morale, scepticism, maximal fixation on internal matters by the CEO. 
The different ph as es of company life cycles are thus characterized by dif-
ferent attitudes and problems. A matter of particular interest, therefore, is 
that the factor analysis of characteristic company problems established two 
v 
Fig. 6 The company's life cycle. 
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new variables, S15Pl and S15P2 (see Figs. 3 and 4) . S15Pl showed high 
loadings for problems pertaining to task allocation, co-ordination, co-
operation, and unnecessary organizational complexity. It has been shown that 
such problems are typical of companies that have become sufficiently large, 
complex, and difficult to manage, i.e. show characteristics impeding rational, 
efficient, and up-to-date activities and development. 7 Facing such problems 
compels the CEO to turn his interest to internal factors. He becomes introvert 
and runs the risk of not finding sufficient time or interest to keep up with 
developments in the external environment. Consequently, he (and the com-
pany) will start falling behind and development will stagnate more and more. 
Considering these problems and the CEO's 'introvert-extrovert' orientation in 
different life cycle phases, it may be said that the behavioural pattern comes 
rather close to that observed in the maturity phase, which (especially if it 
extends over a longer period) may imply stagnation and subsequent decline. 
Companies showing this problem profile are therefore in the present context 
referred to as being in a 'stagnation phase' of their life cycle. 
S15P2 was obtained as a second factor in the factor analysis of company 
problem profiles. It showed high loadings for recognized lack of expertise in a 
company (Fig. 3). Miller and Friesen7 demonstrated that such an expertise-
oriented way of thinking is typical of a company moving through the revival 
phase. There is astrong demand for new know-how as well as development 
and restructuring of all company activities. Experts are called in, employees 
replaced, new strategies devised, and established attitudes scrutinized. In the 
present study, companies facing these problems will therefore be referred to as 
being in the 'revival phase' of their life cycle. 
The regression analysis revealed th at in organizations going through 'the 
revival phase of their life cycle ' , the CEOs' information culture has both width 
and depth (Fig. 3). They re ad and communicate extensively, taking their 
reading seriously. The fact th at they are able to discuss individu al writers and 
articles implies that they memorize and analyse what they read. Their extensive 
active use of external information in their work indicates an information 
culture resembling that of Gatekeepers. This seems to take place at the expense 
of an extremely pronounced oral orientation in their ways of gathering 
information. 
In the same way, a specific approach to information can be observed for 
CEOs of companies in a 'stagnation phase'. Internal exchange of information 
is mainly in writing (Fig. 4). However, written information lacks the social and 
other aspects which would produce a rewarding exchange of knowledge and 
ideas. The marked orientation towards written information therefore supports 
the notion that internal information serves these CEOs mainly as a formal con-
trol instrument. Their need for external information is satisfied by extensive 
reading of the daily press. It can be observed that the reading of newspapers 
increasingly seems to substitute for communication with their contact networks 
as the extent of current problems grows. The CEO's 'introvert' orientation 
becomes increasingly pronounced. Serious journais . do not seem to interest 
- - t~ -
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CEOs of 'stagnating companies'. They do read journaIs, but at the same time 
belong to the category unable to specify individual authors or articles they 
have read. 'I read journals like women read women's magazines' is a statement 
very typical of this group. Nor do these CEOs normally discuss acquired infor-
mation with their colleagues in the company. 
Figures 3 and 4 further indicate that CEOs with a broad and deep personal 
information profile work in companies with a high level of diversified internal 
communication. In the case of CEOs with little interest in information, the 
level of oral communication is downright poor. It is also noticeable that CEOs 
of the former category do not rank the market as the foremost element of suc-
cess, although they emphasize its importance alongside that of other aspects . 
Material resources, such as employees, are not regarded as primary success in-
itiators, but long-term motivation is put forward as an essential success factor. 
This factor is based on concepts such as motivation and continuity (Fig. 3), 
which in present personnel research are seen as essential to successful person-
nel management. These CEOs also stress the importance of actuality as an 
essential element in success. This factor encompasses concepts such as 
knowIedge, actuality and image (Fig. 3). CEOs with a highly developed serious 
interest in information thus seem prepared to invest in expertise, internal com-
munication, knowIedge, 'extrovert orientation', actuaÎity, motivation, and 
continuity, i.e. factors also found to be characteristic of companies moving 
through the development phase. CEOs with a restricted information profile 
manifest an 'introvert' orientation in regard to all these factors. In their opi-
nion, the company's expertise in production and administration is inferior, in 
comparison with the competition. They do not think their companies ought to 
be actively outwardly oriented. This, to them, justifies focusing their attention 
'inwards'. They regard internal administrative competence as an important 
prerequisite for success, but actuality, knowIedge, and image as less significant. 
CEOs with a narrow information profile mainly rely on internal reports 
and, as regards external information, restrict themselves to reading the daily 
press. Their companies, too, show poor formal information systems as weIl as 
friction in administrative co-operation, CEOs of this type attach importance 
to administrative competence and monitored development of material 
resources. These factors fit the generally accepted description of stagnating 
companies. 
Each development phase thus seems to be characterized by its own specific 
company culture, which moulds the common norms and attitudes. 
If the Birth phase and the Growth phase are combined into one, the 
Development phase, the company cultures put forward by Deal and Kennedy3 
can be applied to the various phases as follows: 4 
1. The Development phase has a Tough Guy I Macho culture, characterized 
by a high degree of financial risk-taking and rapid feedback to invest-
ments and described as the 'find a mountain and climb it' ideology. 
2. The Maturity phase has a Work Hard/Play Hard culture with a low 
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degree of risk and rapid feedback to investments, referred to as the 'find 
a need and fiU it' ideology. 
3. The Revival phase has a Bet Your Company culture, which is the 
opposite of the Work Hard/Play Hard culture. 
4. The Decline phase has a Process culture, characterized by low risks, slow 
feedback to investments and a high degree of bureaucracy. Attention 
focuses 'on how something is done rather than on what is being done'. 
The linkage to the market will be examined by plotting the company pro-
ducts in a market growth share matrix (Fig. 7). A company's position, which 
can be any one of four, is determined by two co-ordinates: the relative market 
share of its products and mark et growth rate. The top right field contains 
'question marks', products with low shares of a fast-growing market. 
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Fig. 7 Market growth share matrix (the Boston consuiting groups model ' ). 
Investments in these may produce a product belonging in the top left field, 
i.e. a 'star' with a high share of a rapidly growing market. The products in the 
bottom left corner have high market shares in a stabilized mark et and con-
sequently are the real 'cash cows' continuously supplying the company with 
capital to be used e.g. for the transformation of 'question marks' into 'stars'. 
Just before a product disappears completely from the market, it usuaUy turns 
into a 'dog', i.e. has a small share of a market characterized by a low growth 
rate. 
If one relates the links between life cycle, culture, and market success, as 
I ; proved by Deshpandé et al.,' to the results of the comparison between infor-
mation cultures at different development stages, in different life cycle phases, 
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and as determined by different approaches to information, this produces four 
blocks of characteristic connections (Fig. 8) . The criteria used to define infor-
mation culture were the degree of interest in information and the attitude to 
factors in the external company environment. 
Fig. 8 demonstrates four different blocks, each with a specific CEO infor-
mation culture. 
Degree of interest in information , 
Relative market share, Rate of feedback 
high low 
B A 
Intense interest in Casual attitude to 
information information 
Revival phase Development phase 
Bet Y our Company culture Tough GuylMacho culture 
'ST AR' products 'QUESTION MARK' products 
C D 
Stabie interest in Hostile attitude to 
information information 
Maturity phase Decline phase 
Work Hard / Play Hard Process culture 
culture 'DOGS' products 
'CASH COW' products 
Fig. 8 Linkages between eEO information culture, company culture, life cycle and business 
performance. 
Block A represents a company with a casual attitude to information. With 
regard to the introduction of its products in the market, the company is at an 
initial stage. lts culture is Tough Guy / Macho. lts products are still 'question 
marks'. Marketing is essential. Investments in advertising and sales promotion 
are substantial. Cost and risks are high, return on investment is slow, market 
shares are small, but there is clear market growth. The companies are bold and 
confident. Investing in making the market aware of the company is a far more 
important issue than adapting the company to the market. There is little con-
cern for information from outside. Certainly, the company is extrovert, but 
this applies mainly to the distribution of sales and advertising information. 
Block B. A company with an intense interest in information has a Bet Your 
Company culture. There is market growth, and market shares are substantial. 
The company's products are 'stars'. Investments in marketing and production 
are heavy. Risks are high. Keen competition in the market and the fast feed-
back to strategies necessitate a constant active gathering and in-house dissemi-
nation of information. Investments are geared to the future. Management and 
the whole company become very aware of information. The CEO has a broad 
- -- - . ~~~ 
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information profile, i.e. he makes abundant use of internal and external infor-
mation. He consciously endeavours to create a social environment th at will 
facilitate the flow of information at all levels in the company. He devotes 
himself to serious reading of both professional and scientific journals and 
appreciates expertise. He insists on long-term motivation and continuity. 
Internal communication is at a high level , and the CEO is weIl aware of 
the significance of current information in relation to the history and traditions 
of the company. Continuous efforts are made to up-date knowledge and 
expertise. 
Block C. A company with a stabie interest in information maintains a Work 
Hard / Play Hard culture. lts products are so-called 'cash cows'. The sales 
curve becomes horizontal, growth declines, and the market stabilizes. Risks 
are low and feedback to investment is rapid. Since there is no further market 
growth, companies can increase their shares only by taking over markets from 
each other. This, however, only rarely happens as a result of advertising. More 
frequently, methods such as price competition or customer service are applied. 
This tends to cut profit margins and compels companies to rely on volume. 
Small companies founder, the giants sail through. In this phase, internal func-
tions assume great significance. All transformations of material resources 
must yield optimal profits. The production process is analysed with a view to 
initiating cost-cutting improvements . Internal control becomes prominent. 
The CEO becomes more and more internally oriented, of ten at the expense 
of external information. Complex bureaucracy and supervision, however , 
impede the flow of internal information. Employee expertise declines, and 
so does external know-how. The CEO assumes a bureaucratie and defensive 
attitude towards his environment, relying on formal, written, internal informa-
ti on and information acquired through extensive reading of daily newspapers. 
The contact network orientation gradually becomes weaker. 
Block D . A company with a hostile attitude to information has a Process 
culture. lts products are 'dogs' and the company is in the decline phase. The 
characteristic features of this phase are almost identical with those of the 
maturity phase, only much more accentuated. Market shares are shrinking and 
investments decline. Risk-taking is low and feedback to possible investments is 
slow. The CEO becomes more internally oriented, the Board assumes a more 
prominent position, news is often negative and tends to be shunned by the 
CEO, who communicates less and less, both internally and externally. 
3. Discussion 
It can be concluded th at a highly developed information culture correlates 
positively with successful business performance and is closely connected with 
activities, attitudes, and business cultures initiating successful results. 
The adaptation of a company's business culture, its characteristic problems 
as determined by the life cycle, its approach to the market and its information 
culture emerge as the result of internal interaction and as a rule finally reach an 
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optimal mode within a block. This state of harmony is not easily disturbed. It 
has proved difficult and often impossible to implement a business or informa-
tion culture typieal of one block in another without modifying the other func-
tions. To mention the extreme cases: introducing a Bet Your Company culture 
in the maturity phase or a Tough Guy culture in the decline phase is in-
conceivable. Attempts to make a CEO change his approach to information to 
one of intense interest in an environment hostile to that kind of culture will 
hardly succeed. Consequently, the supply of information to companies must 
be designed to comply with their prevailing culture and requirements. 
A company may decide actively and deliberately to modify the current 
behavioural patterns within its block. To facilitate such change, all the dif-
ferent factors, i.e. the company's culture, approach to information, etc. must 
be kept flexible. If a company can move painlessly from one block to another 
during its life cycle, it is in a position to achieve greater success more smoothly 
and with a minimum of conflict. Quite often very successful companies have 
deliberately maintained a flexible approach in order to avoid being restrieted 
by one particular culture at a certain stage of nieir life cycle. IBM is often 
mentioned as an example of cultural flexibility. 
Obviously, an information culture characterized by intense interest creates 
prospects for successful business performance; in other words, there seems to 
be astrong connection between intellectual and material resource transforma-
tions. It is not sufficient to change one of the factors in a block unless the 
others have been modified to allow for the change. Consequently, intellectual 
resource transformations must be incorporated in strategie planning on an 
equal footing with the planning of material resources. This is the only way of 
ensuring th at various future information needs are recognized in time and 
that the company is sufficiently prepared to meet them as well as capable of 
optimizing both the form and the quality of its intellectual output to provide a 
maximally efficient serviee to the material resource transformations. 
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